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Introduction 
Each of the four commentaries on our paper – for which, needless to say, we are greatly 
appreciative – really deserves a detailed response. Such a response, however, would easily 
take up the space of another full-length paper, if not more. Rather than discussing each of 
the commentaries, and each of the comments therein, separately, we have therefore chosen 
to distil and discuss four themes that appear important both to the commentators and to us: 
theory and abstraction; land rent; mortgage securitization; and the role of the state.  
 
Theory and Abstraction 
Three of the four commentaries converge on the issue of theory, and the role of theory both 
in understanding housing and political economy in general, and within the specific 
conceptual framework we propose. So this seems a reasonable place to start. Julie Lawson 
asks for us to provide greater “clarity” in this regard – “concerning the nature of reality and 
causality, and a view on whether there are any types of laws or tendencies to be found 
mediating housing” – while Herman Schwartz and Mike Berry, in their own ways, do the 
same: the former sensing (but no more) that we are “edging towards a generic and cyclic 
theory of housing in relation to the logic of capital accumulation” (one which he thinks 
impossible), the latter expressing concern about our apparent theoretical “eclecticism.” 
So, let us be clear. For us, theory is ineluctable. Explanation in social science entails 
the positing of causal relations, and this requires the development of theory: generalized 
combinations of reliable and defensible explanatory statements. Such theory development 
indeed necessitates, moreover, “the process of abstraction” referred to by Lawson – 
abstracting from the realm of empirical objects to isolate the significant structures or 
tendencies underlying their materialization (thus furnishing, in Berry’s words, “an 
understanding of the observable complexity of the real world from the deep causal powers at 
work”). But it also requires us to recognize that theories do not and cannot explain individual 
empirical cases in a direct and linear fashion, in part because all such cases represent the 
conjunction of multiple relational structures. In any event, the key resulting recognitions, at 
least from our perspective, are twofold. The first is that theorization, and the abstraction it 
entails, is qualitatively different from description of – even generalization about – empirical 
objects in and of themselves, especially of the kind (positivist empiricism) which treats the 
nature of those objects as unproblematic. And the second, speaking to Lawson’s query 
regarding “the role of empirical work,” is that such empirical work should at once draw 
(critically) upon, test, and thus refine or refute established theoretical conceptualizations. 
This, in turn, leads us to the threefold insistence that theory can never simply stand 
still (how “generic” it is or can be is thus always open to question); neither, speaking to 
another of Schwartz’s suspicions, can it be “cyclic” (and we don’t think we intimated that it 
could or would be); and nor, lastly and most importantly, is the type of theorization we had 
(and have) in mind a theory of housing per se. More accurately, we were and are calling for 
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broadly-based political-economic theorization that acknowledges and asserts the manifold 
and seemingly-deepening materiality of housing to the processes and relations that political 
economy takes as its cumulative, complex object. 
Contra Berry, moreover, we would also defend the open-ended nature of the 
theorization that we offered. If he is right that our account is rooted in Marxism, Berry is also 
right that it aims to integrate insights from other theoretical traditions. There are, no doubt, 
dangers in being theoretically polygamous, not least the one Berry highlights: that of seeking 
to combine what ultimately turn out to be “incommensurate” approaches. In our view, 
however, the risks related to potential incommensurability – and it is striking how often the 
incommensurability in question is merely latent, and rarely substantiated – are substantially 
outweighed by the gains realized when one metaphorically opens-up, during the iterative 
process of theory (re)development, to multiple sources of inspiration. Few contemporary 
Marxists, after all, would gainsay the theoretical – not to mention political – advances 
generated by classical Marxism’s engagement with, say, feminist and postcolonial theories. 
In our view, theories and frameworks that take not only the economics of housing but also its 
politics, history, geography and institutions seriously can in principle be commensurate 
under the critical realist ontology suggested by both Berry and Lawson since critical realism, 
according to its main protagonist, is receptive to different epistemologies in different 
ontological domains (Bhaskar, 1979). A fundamental openness to different theories for 
answering different kinds of questions related to housing potentially produces a better 
understanding of the role of housing in political economy, as long as one is attentive to and 




In amongst the different theories one could possibly draw upon in centering housing in 
political economy, meanwhile, the cluster most conspicuously missing from our account, as 
Berry correctly observes, is that which comprises theories of land rent – thus bringing us to 
the second theme we want to discuss in this response.  
For Berry, the fact that we set the question of land rent to the side represents the 
“great weakness” of our paper. His argument, in a nutshell, is that any meaningful theoretical 
discussion of housing and political economy must confront, head-on, questions of land, land 
rent, and (thus) theories designed to explain the latter. That our paper merely nods to the 
materiality of land rent is thus considered a fatal flaw. Addressing this criticism is, we think, 
very important. Indeed, it may ultimately be the case that in justifying our sidelining – on the 
grounds that we simply did not have the space to give land and land rent the consideration 
they deserve – we were defending the indefensible. At the very least, the justification we 
posited was probably inadequate. We hope, therefore, to do better here. 
First, however, it is important to pause to consider what rent theory is and does; 
Berry helpfully identifies many of the innumerable reasons for land rent’s significance, and 
also identifies some of the different types of rent distinguished by rent theorists (absolute, 
differential, monopoly, and so forth), but he does not spell out the basic fundamentals of the 
theory. This, of course, is far from easy to do, rent theory having assumed multiple different 
configurations through its long and conflictual history. But it also strikes us as critical, if only 
because the nature of rent theory is so often misunderstood; witness, as just one example, 
the common confusion of land rent (in political economy) with the rent-seeking behaviour 
described by mainstream economics. 
First and foremost, as we understand it, land rent is a relational issue insofar as it is 
concerned with the social relations of land ownership and with the power of land owners to 
extract payment from land users. If this is the case, what then is a “theory” of land rent? It is 
one, recalling the above discussion, which seeks through a process of abstraction to 
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formulate defensible explanatory generalizations about the structural tendencies underlying 
empirical patterns in such rents. In doing so, note, it makes the crucial though often 
underappreciated assumption that where the owners sell their land (including frequently, and 
not insignificantly, the house standing upon it), we can conceive the price paid as the 
equivalent of a discounted stream of future rental payments. And, as such, theories of land 
rent proffer a holistic framework for explaining the form and evolution of the spatial economy: 
why different pieces of land in different places are allocated to different land uses, cost 
different amounts to rent and purchase, and are developed and redeveloped in different 
ways. 
Given all of this, where should land rent and rent theory “fit” in the picture we painted 
in our original paper and repaint here? The best way to approach this question, we think, is 
to clarify what we are and are not arguing. Our argument, to reiterate, is that housing must 
be central to scholarly political economy because it is palpably central to the (worldly) 
political economy; and that theory development is essential. What our argument does not 
encompass, however, is the question of which particular set (or sets) of statements about 
underlying political-economic structures and tendencies is best equipped to provide the 
scaffolding of such theory. Given its analytical power to explain precisely the kinds of 
housing-related processes described by Berry, rent theory of one form or another is clearly a 
prime candidate – indeed, probably the prime candidate. But nothing in our paper 
contradicts such a proposition. Rent theory is not an alternative to the framework we flesh 
out therein; it is, rather, complementary, in the sense that its mobilization would 
demonstrably help to operationalize key components of said framework (again, in exactly the 
ways Berry observes). We agree that land underlies all housing and is therefore crucial; yet 
land is about more than housing and at the same time, housing cannot be reduced to land. 
Illustrating and championing the power of rent theory would certainly, therefore, have made 
our paper stronger; we do not agree, however, that leaving rent theory to one side 
diminishes the essential validity of the claims that the paper does make. 
 
Mortgage Securitization 
The commentaries of Dick Bryan and Mike Rafferty and of Schwartz, meanwhile, pay a great 
deal of attention to the issue of mortgage securitization and both implicitly seem to be saying 
that we are not paying enough attention to it. Mortgage securitization, as each commentary 
emphasizes and as we noted in relation to the issue of capital circulation, is a technique to 
make investments in housing that are spatially and temporarily fixed, liquid in space and 
time. Securitization, therefore, enables the circulation of capital in and through housing, 
thereby facilitating capital switching from the primary (production) to the secondary (built 
environment) circuit of capital. 
Yet, differently from earlier forms of capital switching to the secondary circuit, 
securitization does not embody a spatial fix but rather an attempt to circulate capital out of 
the spatial fix that is established through home buying and mortgage lending. That is, 
securitization makes it possible for mortgage lenders to speed up the circulation of mortgage 
credit: once a lender has supplied a certain number of mortgage loans, it can resell the rights 
to these loans (i.e., the mortgage in legal terms) in financial markets with the help of 
government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US) or investment 
banks. This directly frees up mortgage capital to be reinvested, possibly for granting more 
mortgage loans, thereby again enabling capital switching to the secondary circuit. 
Since securitization enables the circulation of capital that is already invested in the 
built environment, it can be seen as effectively helping to create another circuit of capital: 
breaking up – or perhaps better, transcending – the spatial fix, it does not switch capital back 
into the primary circuit of capital, implying a need to expand (or, yes, abandon) the capital 
switching framework. Elsewhere (Aalbers 2008), one of us has suggested to expand the 
framework by introducing a quaternary circuit of capital, which is the “place” where capital 
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flows not to facilitate investment in production (primary circuit), the built environment 
(secondary) or science, technology and the welfare state (tertiary), but to facilitate the growth 
of finance in its own right, i.e. the trade in money, credit, derivatives, etc. Whether one has to 
“invent” a new circuit of capital or not, however, the crucial point – we would thus fully concur 
with our commentators – is that where it is practised securitization has substantively 
changed the rules of the game concerning the circulation of capital in and out of housing. 
Securitization’s importance, of course, extends well beyond – though partly in view of 
– technical questions of capital circulation. Bryan and Rafferty, for example, point to the US 
Federal Reserve purchasing securitized assets, “especially securitised mortgages as if they 
were state money”; while we in Europe see the European Central Bank pushing 
securitization as a way to get out of the crisis because money makes the world, and certainly 
the EU, go round. And round and round again, as if it has already been forgotten that 
securitization was one of the reasons there was overinvestment in housing and other 
securitized assets in the first place, and that it was the demand for mortgage-backed 
securities that made it possible for subprime lending to expand as dramatically and rapidly 
as it did in the US (Ashton 2009) – a process facilitated by the US state (see, in particular, 
Gotham 2009), but driven also by the Basel 2 agreements, as Schwartz notes in his 
commentary, and mirrored by ‘facilitative regulation’ in countries with rapid growth in 
securitization such as the UK (Wainwright 2009) and the Netherlands (Aalbers, Engelen, and 
Glasmacher 2011). 
And yet (to rationalize, at some level, our limited original attention to the subject): 
notwithstanding rapid growth in mortgage securitization in many English-speaking countries 
and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Spain and Italy, mortgage securitization 
remains relatively underdeveloped, or even non-existent, in both most developed and less 
developed countries. This is not to discount the theoretical importance and potential future 
geographical expansion of securitization in relation to housing; it is simply to observe that 
capitalist political economy, and housing’s implication in it, remains much more of a broad 
church than a singular emphasis on securitization might allow. 
 
The Role of the State 
This brings us to the final theme we’d like to highlight in this response: the role of the state in 
our framework. It should come as no surprise that all four commentaries have something to 
say about the state. After all, although we claimed capital as the central category of political 
economy, one could easily argue that the state deserves similar prioritization. Perhaps we 
can agree that capital and the state together are the central concepts of political economy? 
This is not because capital represents the ‘economy’ in political economy and the state the 
‘political’, but because capital and the state are both political and economic in nature, i.e., 
both concepts are prime illustrations of why one cannot separate the political from the 
economic. 
The state is of course a complicated web of institutions that, at least conceptually 
speaking, should be spelled in the plural (but that would add to the confusion). There are 
many theories of the state but most if not all of them argue that the state is everywhere, 
multiscalar and multidimensional. The state is not just the national state, but also exists at 
sub-national and supra-national scales. Among other things, the state plays a crucial role in 
creating, recreating or changing, restricting and facilitating the development of housing 
markets or parts thereof as well as the many actors active in those markets, including a 
variety of state institutions. Regarding housing, the state may, for instance, promote 
gentrification, capital switching to the built environment, securitization, asset-based welfare, 
commodification of housing – or it may do the complete opposite, or even both things at the 
same time. 
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While capital as an interest group follows a specific logic (by which we do not mean 
that things always stay the same, as Schwartz reproaches us), i.e. the logic of accumulation, 
the state in its many shapes and guises may follow multiple sets of logics, often at the same 
time. This presents us with a difficulty: concerned to show the importance of housing to 
political economic analysis and theory, it is considerably more expedient (but also, we 
believe, more powerful) to make this argument through the logic of capital than through the 
logic(s) of the state. This does not mean that the framework we propose ignores the 
importance of the state, nor that we did not see a critique of our treatment of the state 
coming – which is why we wrote in our conclusion that readers “will likely judge that we have 
paid far too little attention to the state, and its role in shaping different housing outcomes in 
different historical and geographical political-economic conjunctures”. But perhaps, indeed, 
the absence of a more coherent conceptualization of the state somewhat weakens our 
framework’s purchase in its original, basic form. 
Any discussion of the roles of the state(s) in housing will ultimately lead to a 
discussion of the extremely wide-ranging state-market configurations in actually existing 
housing regimes. Lawson points to alternative forms of capitalist relations in housing, which 
begs the question: when is something an alternative form of capitalism in housing and when 
is something an alternative form of housing contra capitalism? In actually existing housing 
systems, we see hybrids of the two. Some forms of decommodified housing, e.g. the 
marginal provision of underfunded public housing or homeless shelters, are closer to the 
former, with squatting and sweat equity closer to the latter, and the mass production of 
subsidized rental housing under Fordist capitalism (and sometimes continued since) in many 
European countries a “pure” hybrid. But in all such cases, these forms of housing provision 
are generally framed as being in opposition to fully commodified housing, in particular in 
countries where housing is the most fully commodified. Moreover, the role of the state in 
introducing, promoting and also destabilizing the role of ideology in housing relations can 
hardly be overestimated. All this calls for a clearer theoretical argument regarding the role of 




Invoking the nineteenth-century spirit and words of Marx and Engels, Danny Dorling has 
recently sought to re-insert the housing question at the centre of UK political debate with his 
polemical intervention All That is Solid (2014), dealing with – as the book’s subtitle 
announces – Britain’s “great housing disaster” and how it “defines our times.” The historical 
parallels invoked by Dorling’s book are not exact, but they are certainly uncanny. We want to 
end this response by identifying and reflecting briefly upon some of them. 
First, if Britain – like many other places in the world – is seen today to be wracked by 
a housing crisis, so too was the Northern Europe into which Engels released The Housing 
Question in the early 1870s. In particular, a perception of acute shortages of (affordable) 
housing was in the air then just as much as now. 
Second, for all these perceived shortages, there was then – and is now – no 
shortage of proposed solutions. Then, one that was widely touted in “progressive” circles, 
and which was associated in particular with the French thinker Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, was 
the abolition of rental property; today, the flavour of the month, in the UK at least, seems to 
be the building of more homes. 
Third, however, those arguing against the consensus dispute the pivotal assumption 
of absolute shortages. Dorling says that this notion ignores the substantial housing space 
owned, but not used, by the wealthy. Engels, strikingly, in the 1887 German edition of The 
Housing Question, wrote that “one thing is certain: there is already a sufficient quantity of 
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houses in the big cities to remedy immediately all real ‘housing shortage’, provided they are 
used judiciously” (p. 22). 
Fourth, and partly as a result of this, these dissenters both depart from the standard 
proposals for solutions. Indeed, the parallel goes much deeper. Engels, as we noted in our 
original paper, saw housing (and housing “shortages”) as a derivative, second-order social 
problem, resolvable only if the core inequities of capitalism – those implicit in the capital-
labour relation – were rooted out. Dorling’s take is not incomparable: to overcome the 
housing crisis, he argues, Britain needs to overcome the underlying problem of socio-spatial 
inequality. 
Fifth, and finally, Dorling, like Engels before him, writes into powerful cross- and 
headwinds. Three years after the 1887 reprinting of The Housing Question, Alfred Marshall 
published his Principles of Economics, changing that discipline forever. In 2014, in implicit 
recognition of Marshall’s legacy, the Times Literary Supplement turned, for its review of 
Dorling’s book, to the high priest of supply and demand that is Tyler Cowen, US economics 
professor and of marginalrevolution.com fame. Gently mocking Dorling and his identification 
of unused housing space, Cowen asks, rhetorically, “how to redistribute this unjust largesse 
of sheets and pillows?” Dorling, he argues, fails to provide persuasive answers. Why? “You 
can’t write a good book which attempts to repeal the laws of economics, especially when it 
focuses on an economic topic.” In reconsidering the housing question in political economy, 
by contrast, we have sought to argue that you cannot today come to grips with the laws of 
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